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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OF
ALCOHOLIC FOR PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS HELD TO BE
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL UNDER THE EIGHTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The Fourth Circuit unanimously held that criminal punish-
ment of an alcoholic for public drunkenness violates the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. This landmark decision, while ap-
parently sound, leaves the states with many new problems in ef-
fecting the shift from the jail to the hospital. Some possible solu-
tions to these problems are suggested herein. In addition, the pos-
sibility of applying the rationale of the holding to crimes other
than public drunkenness is considered.
IN Driver v. Hinnant,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recently considered the constitutionality of criminally punishing a
chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness and held that such punish-
ment constituted a violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments. By its decision, the Fourth Circuit offered a glimmer of hope
to the chronic alcoholic who, as a result of conviction after con-
viction for public drunkenness, has found himself revolving through
jailhouse doors with what amounted to a "life sentence on the
installment plan. ' 2
A week after his release from a North Carolina jail for public
intoxication, petitioner Driver was again arrested for being in-
ebriated in public. Although he pleaded guilty,2 evidence taken for
purposes of guiding the court in sentencing clearly established that
Driver was a chronic alcoholic.- Because he was an inveterate of-
1 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
2This phrase was used by Presiding Justice Bernard Botein of the New York
State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in a recent speech before the 1965 Con-
ference on the Handling of Offenders in New York City. Brief for the American
Civil Liberties Union and Washington Area Council on Alcoholism as Amid Curiae,
p. 13 & n., Driver v. Hinnant.
3 In North Carolina, a plea of guilty does not constitute a waiver of any state or
federal claim or right but is only an admission of the facts charged. See, e.g., State v.
Warren, 113 N.C. 683, 18 S.E. 498 (1893), where the court explained that a plea of
guilty constitutes an admission of only the facts charged, not the legal conclusions
arising therefrom. Accord, State v. Smith, 265 N.C. 178, 143 S.E.2d 293 (1965).
' The evidence disclosed that Driver, fifty-eight years old at the time of trial, was
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fender of the public intoxication laws, Driver was sentenced to
two years in prison. Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina,5 Driver sought a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal district court which was also rejected.6 How-
ever, on appeal from denial of the writ, the Fourth Circuit unan-
imously reversed the district court, holding that to punish a chronic
alcoholic for public drunkenness constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Speaking for the court, Judge Bryan likened the movements of an
alcoholic to those "of an imbecile or a person in a delirium of a
fever."7 He noted that "the alcoholic's presence in public is not his
act for he did not will it."" Similarly, he did not voluntarily become
intoxicated: "His excess now derives from disease." 9
Statutes imposing criminal punishment for public intoxica-
tion are recognized as a valid exercise of the police power. 10 Closely
first convicted of public intoxication at age twenty-four. He estimated that he had
spent approximately two-thirds of the intervening thirty-four years in jail for
public intoxication. Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.N.C. 1965), rev'd,
356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). His record documented the following series of arrests:
1935 2 1945 7 1955 19
1936 5 1946 3 1956 14
1937 3 1947 1 1957 10
1938 6 1948 3 1958 7
1939 1 1949 0 1959 5
1940 5 1950 2 1960 5
1941 10 1951 12 1961 6
1942 12 1952 20 1962 0
1943 2 1953 11 1963 8
1944 15 1954 10 1964 6
TOTAL 210
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and Washington Area Council on Al-
coholism as Amid Curiae, p. 6. One hundred ninety-seven of these arrests were for
public intoxication. Driver v. Hinnant, supra at 97 nA.
An affidavit prepared by a physician who had treated Driver was also introduced.
It established that Driver was suffering from "advanced deteriorative changes of
chronic alcoholism" and was a sick man in need of treatment. Id. at 97.
"State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
0 Driver v. Hinnant, 24a F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965), rev'd, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir.
1966).
¢ 356 F.2d at 764.
'Ibid.
'Ibid.
10 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morrisey, 157 Mass. 471, 32 N.E. 664 (1892); cf.
State v. Dew, 248 N.C. 188, 102 S.E.2d 774 (1958).
In addition, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the power of the
states to regulate intoxicants. See Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) (state
power to regulate manufacture, distribution and sale of intoxicating liquors up-
held). In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964), the
Court recognized that such power inhered in the states, id. at 330, but was limited
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related, although in some respects distinguishable, are statutes which
punish other forms of personal condition. This latter type of legis-
lation, which exists in virtually all of the states today, penalizes the
so-called "status" crimes, 1 the most common example being that of
vagrancy.1 2 Statutes punishing such "status" crimes have two unique
characteristics. First, they do not punish an act or failure to act,
which is normally considered an essential element of crime;' 3 rather
they define crime in terms of being.14 In this respect, these statutes
to the extent that it could not be exercised where alcohol in transit was intended to be
used for foreign export.
11For an extensive coverage of the origin of the statutory proscription of status
crimes, see Dubin & Robinson, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and
Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102 (1962). In another leading article,
Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1203
(1953), the author observes that "early English legislation covered a wide variety of
persons, including idle and disorderly persons, beggars, tramps, gypsies, fortunetellers,
unlicensed peddlers, husbands who had abandoned their families, and persons
wandering abroad without being able to give a good account of themselves. Enforce-
ment provisions allowed arrest by any person without a warrant and also permitted
summary proceedings, although several early statutes allowed the giving of security
by the vagrant or by someone on his behalf. Vagrancy legislation in the United
States which began in colonial times, closely follows English models." Id. at 1206.
(Footnotes omitted.)
XZThese crimes of personal condition include the status of a vagrant, a common
prostitute, a common drunk, a common thief, and a tramp or disorderly person.
Relevant statutory provisions commonly classify these offenses under the general
heading of "vagrancy," although some statutes enumerate one or more of these
offenses separately. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 437, 441 (1958) (vagrancy includ-
ing common drunk, tramp); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-336, -340 (1958)
(tramp, vagrancy, including brawlers and common drunkard); FLA. STAT. § 856.02
(1963) (common drunkards and thieves subsumed under vagrancy); MASS. ANN. LAws
ch. 272, §§ 53-54, 63-65, 68 (1956, Supp. 1964) (common nightwalkers, disorderly
conduct, tramp, vagabond); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-336, -338 (1951) (prostitutes, tramp);
TEx. PEN. CODE art.. 607 (1952) (tramps and common prostitutes subsumed under
vagrancy).
See generally ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 437-38 (1958); COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-19
(1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-340 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 881-82
(1953); FLA. STAT. § 856.02 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-7001 (1953); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 436.520 (1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 581 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, §
66 (1959); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 28-1119 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-336 (1951); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2032-33 (1963); TEx. PEN. CODE art. 607-07a (1952); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 63-338 to -339 (1950); WAsH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010 (1957).
13 It may be argued, however, that status crimes such as vagrancy punish the failure
to act, while others punish certain acts such as prostitution. Nonetheless, the most
commonly articulated theoretical basis for these statutes is the punishment of a state
of being. See generally Lacey, supra note 11.
11 In District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1947), the court, in
reviewing a conviction for vagrancy, commented: "[T]he statute denounces and makes
punishable being in a condition of vagrancy rather than, as contended by the ap-
pellant, the particulars of conduct enumerated in the statute as evidencing or char-
acterizing such condition." Id. at 835-36. Similarly, in Harris v. United States, 162
A.2d 503 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1960) which involved an appeal from a conviction
for narcotics vagrancy, the court commented: "In this type police regulation it is now
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are distinguishable from those punishing the act of public drunken-
ness. Secondly, these statutes have the unusual feature of justifying
the imposition of criminal sanctions on the mere possibility that
persons falling within the proscribed class will be prone to commit
a criminal act.15 As such, they are similar to statutes punishing
public drunkenness in that their underlying purpose is the safety
and protection of the public. As a result of these unique charac-
teristics, statutes punishing "status" as a crime raise serious con-
stitutional issues. However, such provisions have thus far gen-
erally been upheld as within the police power of the state,16 as have
statutes governing public drunkenness.' 7
Punishment of a physical or psychological condition cannot be
said to impose sanctions upon an "act" unless it can be said that
the punishment is prescribed for actions which resulted in the con-
dition. Thus, an objection could be made that the punishment of
"status" is violative of the eighth amendment.' However, reliance
on that amendment has been largely fruitless.1 Consequently, there
too settled to doubt that the legislature may dispense with intent as an element of
criminal liability when the regulation is in the exercise of the police powers for the
benefit of the people." Id. at 505.
1'In District of Columbia v. Hunt, supra note 14, the court commented: "A
vagrant is a probable criminal; and the purpose of the statute is to prevent crimes
which may likely flow from his mode of life." Id. at 835. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote
omitted.) In a footnote to the opinion, the court quoted language to the same effect
from the legislative history of the District of Columbia Code. Id. at 835 n.3.
However, justifications other than crime prevention are sometimes offered. For
example, in People v. Bell, 204 Misc. 71, 73-74, 125 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (Nassau County
Ct.), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953), the court asserted in dictum that "it
is evident that the Legislature by the enactment of this statute sought to protect the
decent citizens of the community from contact with those sordid individuals who infest
our stations such as the dirty, disheveled, besotted character whose state is but a step
short of intoxication or vagrancy .... "
2OStatutes punishing status are often assailed as violative of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment because of uncertainty and vagueness, but such an attack
hinges on statutory language and is not aimed at the entire concept behind such
punishment. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Recently, the
District of Columbia vagrancy statute was challenged as being void for vagueness.
However, after hearing the arguments the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted. See Hicks v. District of Columbia, 86 Sup. Ct.
798 (1966).
A recent article, Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need
of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 557 (1960), points out the need for revision of state
laws in this area. Accord, Lacey, supra note 11, at 1223-26.
17See note 10 supra.
28"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
19 See, e.g., the following cases where reliance on the eighth amendment was re-
jected: Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947) (opinion
of Reed, J.) (second attempt to electrocute); Badders v. United States, 240 U.S.
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has been a dearth of Supreme Court decisions delineating any clear
constitutional standards to aid in determining what constitutes
"cruel and unusual" punishment.20 At the same time, it is at least
clear that there can be no fixed definition of "cruel and unusual,"
for recent pronouncements by the courts indicate that the concept
is an evolving one, responsive to modern penal conceptions.21
Leading eighth amendment cases have enunciated only the vaguest
of guidelines, however, tautologically interpreting "cruel and un-
usual" as involving both the notion of punishment that is "in-
herently cruel" 22 and that which is said to be "cruelly excessive.
23
391, 394 (1916) (sentence attacked as excessive); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126,
135-36 (1903) (same); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313 (1901) (extended
punishment for habitual criminal); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878)
(shooting as means of inflicting death penalty); Bryson v. United States, 265 F.2d 9,
12-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 919 (1959) (sentence attacked as disproportionate
to the harm); Harris v. United States, 190 F.2d 503, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1951) (same);
Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, 237-38 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801
(1947) (same); Rowley v. Welch, 114 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (same); Ex parte
Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1951) (jail conditions); Rosenberg v. Carroll,
99 F. Supp. 630, 632-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (same). But see Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910).
20 "This Court has had little occasion to give precise content to the Eighth Amend-
ment, and, in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this is not surprising." Trop v.
Dulles, supra note 19, at 100 (opinion of Warren, C.J.). See Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rnv.
846 (1961).
Another possible reason for the lack of authority dealing with the eighth amend-
ment is that it was only recently made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Robinson v. California, supra note 19. In Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, supra note 19, the Court assumed but did not explicitly hold that
the eighth amendment applied to the states by way of the fourteenth. In announcing
the judgment of the Court, Mr. Justice Reed noted that "we shall examine the cir-
cumstances under the assumption, but without so deciding, that violation of the
principles of the . . . Eighth Amendment . . . would be violative of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 462. (Footnote omitted.) Following
Resweber, the Court on at least two occasions considered claims for relief against
the states for inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344
U.S. 86 (1952) (per curiam); Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864, reversing 175 F.2d 250 (3d
Cir. 1949). Although relief was denied in these cases because of failure to exhaust
state remedies, the Court apparently felt that it had power to grant the relief sought.
In Robinson v. California, supra- note 19, the Court for the first time expressly in-
corporated the eighth amendment into the fourteenth. Id. at 667.
21 See id. at 676 (Douglas, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, supra note 19, at 100;
Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 63-64, 196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1946).
22 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471-72 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937)); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (dictum); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136
(1878) (dictum). It would seem that the concept of "inherently cruel" encompasses
more than torture or unnecessary cruelty. Rather, it conceives punishment to be
consistent with a recognition of "the dignity of man" and within the limits of
"civilized standards." Trop v. Dulles, supra note 19, at 100.
In Trop, the Supreme Court held that the punishment of denationalization, was
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Thus, impeding the punishment of status by the invocation of the
eighth amendment has been speculative and largely uncharted.
Although the issue presented by the Driver case has not been
considered by the Supreme Court, the recent case of Robinson v.
California24 did present a closely related question. In Robinson,
the Court held unconstitutional a California statute which criminally
proscribed the condition or "status" of drug addiction.2 The Court,
recognizing that drug addiction is an illness, placed it in the same
category as mental illness, leprosy and venereal diseases and pointed
out that these conditions can no longer be constitutionally pun-
ished as crimes. 26 Despite two dissenting opinions, there was no
articulated division within the Court on the principle that the im-
position of criminal sanctions on an addict who has lost the power
of self-control constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth amendment.27
unconstitutionally cruel. Announcing the judgment of the Court, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren stated that "there may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive
torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized
society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for
the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The
punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political
community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens
to find himself. ... In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights." Id. at
101-02.
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra, Mr. Justice Reed, in upholding
a second attempt at execution as constitutional, indicated that the intention of those
imposing the punishment was an element in the determination of whether the punish-
ment was inherently cruel. Id. at 464.
2' See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The notion of "cruelly
excessive" would appear to prohibit punishment which does not achieve any of the
five well-recognized objectives which include condemnation, isolation, deterrence,
rehabilitation and retribution. See Note, 16 STAN. L. REv. 996, 1011 (1964).
2,370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2r The defendant had been picked up by the police merely on the assumption
that he was an addict, as evidenced by scar tissue and discoloration on the underside
of his arm. The police did not apprehend the defendant while under the influence
of or using narcotics, nor did they find any in his possession. Id. at 661-62.
26 Id. at 666.
27 In his dissent, Mr. Justice Clark construed the statute as imposing punishment
only on the addict who had not yet lost his self-control as to the use of drugs. He
disagreed with the majority conclusion that on the evidence, the defendant had re-
tained the power of self-control, and thus in his opinion the statute imposed a proper
punishment. Further, Clark pointed out that if the addiction was found to be in-
voluntary, the state provided for civil commitment rather than criminal punishment.
Id. at 679, 680-82. 685 (dissenting opinion).
Mr. Justice White clearly stated that he would have "other thoughts" about the
case if the statute punished the "status" of drug addiction or an addict who had
lost the power of self-control. However, he construed the California statute as pun-
ishing only habitual use of narcotics by the voluntary addict rather than the "status"
of addiction, Id. at 685-86 (dissenting opinion).
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Thus, Robinson provided a legal springboard for the Fourth
Circuit in its consideration of Driver. At the outset, the appellate
court acknowledged the voluminous medical authorities categorizing
alcoholism as a disease.28 Judge Bryan took notice of the fact that
one symptom of alcoholism was an appearance in public which was
"unwilled and ungovernable by the victim. '2 9 Judge Bryan then
applied the rationale of Robinson to the facts of the Driver case and
observed that the California statute struck down in the former case
punished as a crime the involuntarily assumed "status" of drug
addiction, while the North Carolina statute criminally punished an
involuntary "symptom" of a "status," the symptom being public
intoxication. He concluded that if the former statute is violative
of the eighth amendment, the reasoning of Robinson would like-
wise condemn the North Carolina statute when applied to a person
in the circumstances of Driver.30 Judge Bryan then proceeded to
summarize: "The upshot of our decision is that the State cannot
stamp an unpretending chronic alcoholic as a criminal if his drunken
public display is involuntary as the result of disease." 31
One circuit has already adopted the Driver rationale with respect
to chronic alcoholism,3 2 and Driver's extension of the "status" rule
28 356 F.2d at 763-64. The court noted that the National Committee on Alcoholism
has defined the chronic alcoholic as a "person who is powerless to stop drinking and
whose drinking seriously alters his normal living pattern." Quoted in id. at 763. The
court in Driver accepted this definition as well as a similar one propounded by the
American Medical Association. Id. at 763-64. It also cited other authorities for the
proposition that alcoholism is a disease: 2 CECIL & LOEB, A TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
1625 (10th ed. 1959); GUTrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 318-22
(1952); JELUINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 41-44 (1960). 356 F.2d at 764
& n.6.
20 Id. at 764.
30 Id. at 764-65.
31 Id. at 765.
_2 In a case decided subsequent to Driver, Easter v. District of Columbia, Civil No.
19365, D.C. Cir., March 31, 1966, it was held that "chronic alcoholism is a defense to
a charge of public intoxication and, therefore, is not a crime in violation of
[the District of Columbia public intoxication law]." Id. at 2.
The Easter decision was more easily rationalized than Driver since an act of Con-
gress, 61 Stat. 744 (1947), authorized the courts of the District of Columbia to take
judicial notice that chronic alcoholism was a disease warranting treatment as opposed
to punishment. Thus, the court could conclude that the statute precluded "at-
taching criminality in this jurisdiction to intoxication in public of a chronic alcoholic."
Id. at 4. However, the Easter court tendered a broad alternative ground for its con-
clusion which was based squarely on the Driver rationale. "Our decision would be
the same were we without the guidance furnished by the Act of 1947. One who is a
chronic alcoholic cannot have the mens rea necessary to be held responsible criminally
for being drunk in public." Id. at 7. The Easter court relied in large measure on
Driver for this conclusion, quoting extensively from Judge Bryan's opinion. Id. at 7-11.
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of Robinson to encompass "involuntary symptoms" of a status will
have widespread effect if it is similarly adopted by the other cir-
cuits. First of all, approval of the Driver rationale can mean the end
to the inhumane treatment of the alcoholic who, as a victim of
"street cleaning operations" employed by the police in locales such
as the skid-row areas of the larger cities, finds himself perpetually
passing in and out of jails without any attempt to rehabilitate him.88
By its decision, the court places the responsibility for the chronic
offender squarely in the hands of the public health agencies.84 This
approach offers hope to all alcoholics,35 particularly those in the
early stages of their illness who previously were subjected to a re-
" The treatment of the chronic offender in the hands of the law enforcement
agencies has been subject to recent critical scrutiny. "The thousands of alcoholics
who spend most of their lives 'wearing out the jails' of their home counties are more
than a nuisance to the public, more than a heavy burden on the taxpayer, more than
a menace to health. They are symbols of public indifference, of governmental in-
eptitude.
"Our method of dealing with them-the 'street cleaning operation' by which they
are swept out of the doorways and alleys and gutters of our Skid Rows, to be
dumped into 'drunk tanks' scarcely less filthy than the gutters, their brief contact with
the court, their meaningless run around through revolving door jails, their stumbling
return to Skid Row, the failure to provide humane, scientific, sustained care and
treatment with effective follow-up by clinics and social agencies after their release-
all this constitutes a violation of basic principles of common sense and common
humanity." CrnzEs' ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CRIME
PREVENTION, CALIFORNIA JAILS 16 (1956), quoted in MacCormick, Correctional Views
on Alcohol, Alcoholism, and Crime, 9 CIME & DELINQUENCY 15, 17-18 (1963).
In describing Driver's situation, the Director of the North Carolina Prison Depart-
ment made the following observation in a letter to the district court judge: "For the
most part men such as Driver are guilty of nothing other than being drunk in
public. . . . The Prison Department would be ready supporters of any legislation
which would provide more appropriate treatment than imprisonment for these un-
fortunates whose only offense is succumbing publicly to the disease of alcoholism."
Letter from George W. Randall to Eastern District Court of North Carolina Judge
A. L. Butler, Feb. 19, 1965, in Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and Wash-
ington Area Council on Alcoholism as Amid Curiae, at app. dl.
"Upon vacating the judgment, the court remanded the case to the district court
with an order for Driver's release unless the state should chose to place him under
civil remedical custody within ten days. 356 F.2d at 765.
"In the brief prepared by the defense, the hopelessness of Driver's situation was
compared to the myth of Sisyphus. According to this ancient tale, "Sisyphus was
doomed by a power beyond his control to continually roll a rock up a steep mountain
slope, where, upon arrival, the rock would slip away and roll down the mountain
to the bottom, where Sisyphus was fated to always begin anew." Brief for Appellant,
p. 10.
Driver himself apparently was concerned about his future. At one point during
his trial, in testifying about his illness, he said: "'I want to do something about it
but it don't look like I can.'" Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and Wash-
ington Area Council on Alcoholism as Amid Curiae, p. 8. Driver also remarked: "'No,
I have got a bad record for drinking. I know that, and it don't look like-I haven't been
able to do anything for it.... I would like to get some help.'" Ibid.
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current cycle of arrest and jail, thus lowering the prospect of inte-
grating them into conventional society even if their condition was
curable.8 6
Secondly, a theoretic merger of the doctrines of Driver and
Robinson provides an avenue of approach for attacking the consti-
tutionality of criminal statutes which punish symptoms of un-
willed status. For example, the homosexual may be able to seek
shelter from criminal prosecution if it can be shown that his actions
are no longer volitive.37 Also, it would appear that by virtue of an
amalgamation of the two rationales a chronic drug addict who has
lost all power of self-control and is recognized as having a disease s
may have a valid defense for a charge of being under the influence of
narcotics and, in the case of chronic addiction, for the commission
of a crime to obtain the drug.39 In both of these examples, the act
0 In a recent study of the chronic offender sponsored by the State Mental Com-
mission of New' York, it was observed that the chronic offender is stigmatized by
society "and is outside the pale of respectability." It was found that the psychological
impact of arrest after arrest destroyed any initiative to reform which an individual
might have. The following conclusion was reached: "[S]ociety's accepted manner of
dealing with the public drunkard is to place him in a county or city jail or peni-
tentiary, along with other misdemeanants, where the framework is one of repression
instead of treatment. In the process, the resources of the individual suffer further
deterioration and the development of the institutionalized offender occurs-one whose
pattern of life becomes a constant movement from incarceration to release and re-
incarceration, with increasing dependency on the institution." PirrMAN & GORDON,
REvOLVING DooR-A STUDY Or THE CHRONIC POLICE CASE INEBRIATE 42 (1958).
"T The homosexual deviation generally results from psychological disorders. ScsuR,
CRIb Es WrHouTr Vicruis 71-72 (1965); see GuTrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 11-14. For an excellent summary of the many factors, including psycho-
logical disorders, which may lead to the commission of sex offenses, see East, Sexual
Offenders-A British View, 55 YALE L.J. 527, 530-43 (1946); Note, 96 U. PA. L. REv.
872, 873 n.11 (1948).8 In Robinson, counsel for the state noted that "it is generally conceded that a
narcotic addict, particularly one addicted to the use of heroin, is in a state of mental
and physical illness. So is an alcoholic." 370 U.S. at 667 n.8. One member of the
Supreme Court pointed out that "the addict is a sick person. He may, of course, be
confined for treatment or for the protection of society. Cruel and unusual punish-
ment results not from confinement, but from convicting the addict of a crime." Id.
at 676. (Douglas, J., concurring.) (Footnotes omitted.)
" See 37 TuL. L. REv. 119, 124 (1962), suggesting that Robinson could lead even-
tually to a revision of existing laws affecting drug addicts, such a revision being
predicated upon a realization that the addict can no longer "be held responsible for
crimes he commits pursuant to his illness." In 111 U. PA. L. REv. 122, 127 (1962), it
was pointed out that punishing an addict for any acts "compelled" by his disease is
"equivalent to punishing the addict for addiction itself." See also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 6.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.12, comment at 30-31
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
It is interesting to note that as early as 1870 an Indiana court held that evidence
concerning the effect on an opium addict of deprivation of the drug was admissible
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punishable is a symptom or manifestation of an illness seemingly
within the rationale of Driver, while Robinson standing alone would
proscribe punishment only of the illness of "status" itself.
The court in Driver was careful to limit its opinion to the
chronic alcoholic. The court specifically stated that the North Caro-
lina statute" under which Driver was convicted was constitutional
as applied to "the excessive-steady or spree-voluntary drinker."41
To avert a criminal conviction under the statute one must prove
to the satisfaction of the court that he is an alcoholic. 42 Also, the
court clearly stated that its holding was not to be interpreted as
contradicting the well-settled rule that voluntary drunkenness is no
excuse for crime.43 With respect to behavior other than acts which
can be called "compulsive as symptomatic of the disease," an alco-
holic is to be judged on the same basis as any other member of the
community.44 However, this test, particularly the use of the word
"symptomatic," is susceptible of divergent interpretations and is
likely to provide some difficulty for judges and lawyers. 45 A strict
to show that he could not have had the requisite mental condition to commit
larceny. Rogers v. State, 33 Ind. 543 (1870).
4o"If any person shall be found drunk or intoxicated on the public highway, or
at any public place or meeting, in any county . . . herein named, he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished as is provided in this
section:
"12. In ... Durham [County] ... by a fine, for the first offense, of not more than
fifty dollars ($50.00), or imprisonment for not more than thirty days; for the second
offense within a period of twelve months, by a fine of not more than one hundred
dollars ($100.00), or imprisonment for not more than sixty days; and for the third
offense within any twelve months' period such offense is declared a misdemeanor,
punishable as a misdemeanor within the discretion of the court." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-335 (Supp. 1965).
"1356 F.2d at 764.
"2 See note 56 infra.
" See Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 633-34 (1881) (citing common law rule); Martin
v. State, 228 Md. 311, 316, 179 A.2d 865, 868 (1962) (voluntary intoxication no defense
to first degree murder prosecution and jury may convict if necessary intent was
present); Bradford v. State, 208 Tenn. 500, 347 S.W.2d 33 (1961) (voluntary intoxica-
tion no defense to charge of burglary and question of whether defendant had requisite
intent properly left to jury).
"1356 F.2d at 764.
"rThe word "symptom" means that which seems to point out the existence of
something else-any sign or indication. WEBSTER, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2318
(3d ed. 1961). In medical terminology, "symptom" is defined as any departure from
normal function or appearance which is indicative of disease. STEDMAN, MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1456 (20th ed. 1961).
In the case of alcoholism, it would appear that by the above definitions any
abnormal behavior of an alcoholic while intoxicated may be considered "symptomatic"
if it is characteristic of his disease or constitutes a departure from normal appearance
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reading of the opinion would confine the holding to the facts and
excuse an alcoholic from criminal prosecution only as to the offense
of public intoxication and not other crimes, such as reckless driving
or larceny, which he might commit while drunk.48 Under this nar-
row view, such acts, while possibly "compulsive," would not be con-
sidered "symptomatic" of alcoholism. Yet without excessive divina-
tion, one can give these words a much broader connotation by
emphasizing, as the Driver court did in its opinion, the well recog-
nized medical fact that intoxication caused by chronic alcoholism
is involuntary.47 Logically, then, "involuntary intoxication" should
be available to the chronic alcoholic as a defense to acts committed
while under the influence of alcohol. "Involuntary intoxication"
as traditionally utilized has constituted a defense to the criminal
conduct of a person who commits an offense while under the in-
fluence of alcohol or other drugs if administered through fraud,
force or mistake.48 Although occasions for application of this de-
fense have not been frequent, once involuntary intoxication has
been proven it is well settled that it will cure the criminal stigma
of an act committed under its influence. 49
Thus, as an extension of the Driver rationale, it is possible to
argue that the alcoholic is provided with the defense of involuntary
intoxication to crimes such as manslaughter which he commits
while drunk and to which voluntary intoxication would be no de-
and indicates the presence of the disease. These definitional vagaries are difficult to
transplant into a pragmatic legal context, however. Given no definite legal guide-
lines-the court in Driver failed to define "symptomatic" or to place any limitations
on its meaning-it is difficult to see why public drunkenness is any more "symptomatic"
than any other act on the part of an alcoholic while drunk, as, for example, driving
a car.
"6 See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
17 356 F.2d at 764. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and Washington
Area Council on Alcoholism as Amici Curiae, pp. lf-2f. See JELLINEK, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 111-21, 139-55; Pfeffer, The Natural History of Alcoholism, in ALcoHousm
AS A MEDICAL PROBLEM 66-67 (Krause ed. 1956).
,8 Cases where the defense was allowed to be raised include Burrows v. State, 38 ARiz.
99, 297 Pac. 1029 (1931) (intoxication under duress a defense to homicide); Bartholo-
mew v. People, 104 Ill. 601, 606 (1882) (intoxication caused by fraud or contrivance
a defense to larceny); People v. Koch, 250 App. Div. 623, 294 N.Y. Supp. 987 (1937)
(intoxication resulting from doctor's prescription as a defense to the misdemeanor
of drunk driving).
The defense of involuntary intoxication contemplates the absence of an exercise
of independent judgment and volition on the part of the accused. PERKINS, CRMINAL
LAw 781, 787 (1957).
9 See cases cited note 48, supra. Involuntary intoxication is placed on the same
basis as insanity in regard to criminal capacity. See PERKINs, op.-cit. supra note 48,
at 783.
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fense.50  Nothing in the opinion would appear to prevent this
result. On the contrary, the court's statement that the appearance
of an alcoholic in public is not voluntary51 affords a basis for con-
tending that not only appearing in public but also many acts on the
part of the alcoholic while intoxicated may also be termed involun-
tary. Although this constitutes an extreme extension of the Driver
rationale, such an argument might well succeed if the interpretational
boundaries erected to confine the phrase "compulsive as symptomatic
of the disease" are sufficiently broad.52
The defense of involuntary intoxication would be especially
apposite in prosecutions for crimes involving a specific intent 8a
The court lends support to such a position by the following remark
regarding Driver's state of mind while drunk:
Although his misdoing objectively comprises the physical elements
of a crime, nevertheless no crime has been perpetrated because
the conduct was neither actuated by an evil intent nor accom-
panied with a consciousness of wrongdoing, indispensable in-
gredients of a crime.54
If Driver is adopted in other jurisdictions, the courts initially
must face the difficult task of determining a practical means of
identifying those persons who are truly alcoholics in the medical
sense. 55 While the Driver court in its opinion offers no concrete
50 For example, if an alcoholic, while drunk, drives recklessly through a red light
and kills a pedestrian, he would arguably have a defense to a prosecution for homicide.
Intoxication per se has not traditionally been considered as a defense. See, e.g., the
following cases upholding convictions for manslaughter: People v. Mead, 126 Cal. App.
2d 164, 271 P.2d 619 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Espinoza v. People, 142 Colo. 96, 349 P.2d 689
(1960); French v. State, 99 Ga. App. 149, 107 S.E.2d 890 (1959); State v. Johnson, 12
Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d 1019 (1961).
51 "This addiction-chronic alcoholism-is now almost universally accepted medically
as a disease. The symptoms, as already noted, may appear as 'disorder of behavior.'
Obviously, this includes appearances in public, as here, unwilled and ungovernable
by the victim." 556 F.2d at 764. (Emphasis added.)
See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
This is not to say that an alcoholic would have a defense to murder committed
while he was drunk if he actually formed the intent to kill prior to becoming in-
toxicated. In such a case, his wrongful act would dearly not be "compulsive as
symptomatic" of his disease. See People v. Norwood, 39 Cal. App. 2d 503, 103 P.2d
618, 619 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940) (robbery); Harris v. Commonwealth, 183 Ky. 542, 547, 209
S.W. 509, 511 (1919) (murder); State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 741 (1882) (murder).
"8356 F.2d at 764.
55 "Alcoholism and excessive drinking have never been rigidly dichotomized to
the satisfaction of most students in the field of alcoholism research. This difficulty
has been aptly phrased by . .. [a noted authority on the subject]. 'All alcoholics are
problem drinkers, but not all problem drinkers are alcoholics.' Some of the chronic
inebriate offenders are confirmed alcoholics; others are miscreants whose present
use of alcohol is preliminary to confirmed alcoholism; and others are nonaddicted
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suggestions, it is doubtful whether a crisp definition of itself will
prove to be of any substantial value. At a point early in a proceeding
against a defendant claiming to be an alcoholic, medical and psy-
chological examinations must inevitably be made in order to estab-
lish the presence of the illness."6 Such an examination will obviously
involve considerable delay unless the court is permitted to take
judicial notice of the fact of the defendant's illness. 57 There is the
additional consideration that a large percentage of alcoholics will
qualify as indigents and, although charged with the burden of
proving their illness, will be without means to do so. This will in
all probability necessitate a shifting of the responsibility to the
state to provide necessary medical examinations."
excessive drinkers who will never become alcoholics." PITrMAN & GORDON, Op. Cit. supra
note 36, at 2-3. See also JELLINEK, op. cit. supra note 28, at 35-41.
3" Rules will have to be developed by the states as to the burden of proving al-
coholism. One approach would be to adopt the particular rule already in effect in a
given state regarding the burden of proof in insanity pleas. In cases where sanity
is in issue, there are three views on the burden of proof:
(1) By the orthodox view, the burden of proving the accused's sanity is on the
state in the sense that the state bears the risk of non-persuasion, and the persuasion
must be beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Hurt v. United States, 327 F.2d 978, 981
(8th Cir. 1964); Fisher v. State, 140 Neb. 216, 219, 299 N.W. 501, 502 (1941). How-
ever, "the general presumption of sanity suffices for the prosecution's duty to produce
evidence, and only the duty of producing evidence of insanity is thrown upon the
accused." 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2501, at 361 (3d ed. 1940).
(2) As a variation of the orthodox view, a minority of states have adopted "a
mere preponderance of evidence as the measure of persuasion required [of the state],
instead of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. See People v. Nino, 149 N.Y.
317, 43 N.E. 853 (1896).
(3) An increasing number of states have adopted the view that "the accused has
the burden of proving insanity, in the sense that he has the risk of persuading the
jury . . . at least by a preponderance of evidence, and also, of course, has the duty
of producing evidence .... " WxGMoR, op. cit. supra § 2501. See, e.g., Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); People v. Monk, 14 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637, 363 P.2d 865,
869 (1961); State v. Quigley, 26 RI. 263, 275-76, 58 Ad. 905, 910 (1904).
"At least in cases where extreme addiction seems apparent, undue delay could be
avoided by allowing judges to hear evidence on the question of alcoholism and, if
within their discretion it seems advisable, to take judicial notice of the presence of the
illness without requiring a formal medical examination. See UNFORM RuLES OF
EVIDENCE 9-12. See generally McCoRMicK, EvmFNc §§ 323-31 (1954). As in Driver,
there may be sufficient evidence available to render an examination unnecessary. See
note 4 supra and accompanying text.
18A requirement that the states provide for medical examinations in the case
of an indigent would appear to be concomitant to the Driver decision since the
examination is crucial to his defense to a criminal charge. A state may possibly
use the same test for indigency already in effect in that particular jurisdiction. For a
complete outline and analysis of the various tests in existence, see 1 SmvIERSMIN,
DEFENSE OF THE POOR 105-22 (1965).
Assumption by the state of the responsibility for providing examinations upon
judicial order would be consonant with legislation already in existence in most states
establishing procedures for the commitment of inebriates at the discretion of the court.
See note 59 infra.
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Once the problem of segregating alcoholics from other less
afflicted offenders is solved, the states will be faced with the choice of
either allowing the alcoholic to go free or providing for civil com-
mitment. It is unlikely that any state will choose the former al-
ternative and the latter choice will pose many new problems. State
facilities will necessarily have to be available to provide the alcoholic
with treatment and rehabilitation. North Carolina and other
states have provided by statute for the civil commitment of alco-
holics for treatment, 9 but this may have the equally undesirable
effect of overcrowding existing facilities.
More significantly, general acceptance of the result of the Driver
case could pose a novel constitutional issue. While the courts
recognize that those suffering from communicable diseases such as
tuberculosis may be subject to compulsory commitment in a hos-
pital or similar institution for treatment,6 0 the confinement of an
alcoholic against his will presents a somewhat different considera-
tion. Authorities on the subject of alcoholism have found that
without a desire to be cured on the part of the alcoholic, there is
virtually no chance of recovery.61 In cases where the patient desires
help, the odds are still somewhat against recovery. 2 To commit an
unrepentant alcoholic to an institution for treatment until cured,
particularly in view of the fact he has no communicable disease,
may result in a punishment just as "cruel and unusual"63 as a jail
sentence.
59 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-155g (Supp. 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
122-60 to -65.5 (1964); D.C. CODE § 24-501 to -514 (1961). It should be pointed out,
however, that commitment under these statutes is generally within the discretion of
the court, although provision is sometimes made for voluntary admission. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 122-56 to -57 (1964).
'
0 See, e.g., Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
61 "As for the possibility of arrestability in the individual case, this seems to rest
primarily on the degree of motivation present or potentially present in the patient.
If the alcoholic is not motivated to have help, he cannot be helped." Pfeffer, supra
note 47, at 75. (Emphasis added.)
1 62"With treatment, when measured in terms of total abstinence, according to
most reports arrestability appears to be possible in approximately 60 per cent of
cases. I myself have tremendous skepticism about such figures; I believe they are
much too high." Ibid.
Jellinek has concluded that a minimum of 25% success is possible in public insti-
tutions using fairly elaborate psychotherapy. JELLINFK, ALCOHOL ADDnTION AND
CHRONIC ALCOHOLiSm 76 (1942). He noted that one therapist reported only a 7%
estimate of success with a group of court commitments which included a large num-
ber of "hobos and psychopaths." Id. at 74-76.
" Use of this phrase is not intended to imply that an attack could be made upon
a statute imposing civil commitment by reliance on the eighth amendment, since the
guarantees of that amendment extend only to criminal punishment. See, e.g., United
[Vol. 1966: 545
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The court in Driver does not suggest what a court should do if an
alcoholic does not desire to be cured, and it has been suggested that
he cannot, unlike the tuberculosis patient, be cured against his will.
He may ultimately be confined in a hospital for a much longer
period than he would have spent in jail, perhaps even for life if his
release is conditioned upon a successful cure.64 Forced civil com-
mitment may be justified in the case of an alcoholic, as it has been
in that of the juvenile offender,65 on the theory that the public
interest in rehabilitation of the offender is paramount. The states
possess broad police powers which authorize the imposition of re-
strictions upon individual liberty for the protection of public
health, morals and safety.66 However, if such state action bears only
a remote relation to the legitimate end sought to be achieved, it may
be deemed to transgress the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.67 Once it is established that an alcoholic is incurable
by any of the known methods of treatment, further detention would
no longer meaningfully serve any rehabilitative purpose and would
constitute an unjust denial of liberty in violation of fourteenth
amendment due process. Even in this situation, however, confine-
ment might be sustained on the alternative ground of protecting
States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33, 40 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
964 (1955) (deportation); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 608, 4 N.W.2d 18, 28
(1942) (commitment of sexual psychopath); Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 726, 41
S.W.2d 176, 178 (1931) (commitment of juvenile). See also Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv.
846, 854 (1961).
:' See note 61 supra.
5 The statutes governing juveniles vary from state to state, but the uniform under-
lying philosophy is that youthful offenders are in need of protection and rehabili-
tation. An excellent summary of this type of legislation may be found in PERKINS,
op. cit. supra note 48, at 733-38.
60 See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 24-29 (1905); People v. Niesman, 356 Ill. 322, 190 N.E. 668 (1934); People
ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 117 N.Y. Supp. 322, aff'd per curiam,
196 N.Y. 525, 89 N.E. 1109 (1909).
67 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
30-35 (1905); Note, 39 CoLum. L. Rxv. 534, 542 (1939).
For example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, supra, the Court, in speaking of the
state's power to require compulsory vaccination, said: "The state legislature proceeded
upon the theory which recognized vaccination as at least an effective, if not the best-
known, way in which to meet and suppress the evils of smallpox .... [I]f a statute
purporting to have been enacted to protect public health, the public morals, or the
public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all
question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the
duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution." Id.
at 30. Although the state's power was upheld in Jacobson, it is clear from the Court's
language that if the vaccination had been found to be ineffective the state could not
have constitutionally administered it.
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the public from a particular alcoholic's demonstrated "dangerous-
ness" or propensity for crime.68
In view of the problems that may result from a requirement of
civil commitment, a state might choose to seek an alternative means
of treatment. However, a satisfactory and workable scheme does
not readily present itself.69 Hopefully, however, as public concern
over alcoholism continues to increase,70 state legislatures will adopt
a fresh approach in seeking a more satisfactory means of treating
the alcoholic, perhaps ultimately arriving at some method of pre-
ventive treatment. Experience already gained in the treatment of
other social problems necessitating civil commitment in some form
might serve as a guide. For example, alcoholics could be placed
in institutions modeled after the "half-way" houses which have
been used successfully in treatment of drug addicts and juvenile
delinquents.71 The alcoholic would be given a chance to adjust to
a normal life in the outside world while retaining contact with
professional counselors and others who share his problems.7 2 A much
68 For a discussion of a penal system structured to reflect the degrees of "social
dangerousness" in treatment of individual criminal defendants, see generally Glueck,
Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARv. L. Rzv. 453, 475 (1928); cf. note 15
supra and accompanying text.
An interesting tangential question is posed by the alcoholic who has no desire to
be cured. It can be argued that this choice is voluntary and taints any defense based
on alcoholism, resulting in a waiver of this defense. However, such reasoning appears
circular since the resistance to cure may also be "symptomatic" of the disease.
61 For example, in lieu of forced commitment, a state might elect to pass a statute
imposing a duty on the alcoholic himself to refrain from drinking or be subject to
criminal punishment; such a statutory sidestep would seem clearly to be precluded
by the rationale of Driver. 356 F.2d at 765. A state could also attempt to control
the sale of liquor to alcoholics by imposing a penalty on the seller requiring
him to subject the customer to a test to determine if he is an alcoholic; such
a restriction, although ostensibly valid, would prove relatively ineffective for
obvious practical reasons. Present state statutes prohibiting sale of alcoholic
beverages to intoxicated persons or drunkards have been held to demand only
that the seller exercise normal powers of observation as to the condition of his
customers. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 973, 975-76, 185 P.2d 105,
106 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (statute prohibited sale to persons "obviously intoxicated.")
70 Congress itself was made aware of the problem as early as 1947 when committee
hearings were conducted regarding the need for legislation in the District of Columbia
to provide for rehabilitation of the chronic alcoholic offender. Evidence was introduced
at these hearings which establilhed that over a period of twelve years there were
318,000 arrests for public drunkenness in the District of which about 60% were
chronic offenders. 93 CONG. REc. 3357 (1947) (remarks of Representative Miller).
"'These facilities serve as pre-release guidance centers to aid in the difficult tran-
sition from total incarceration to complete release to the community. See Kennedy,
Halfway Houses Pay Off, 10 CIUME & DELINQUENCY 1-7 (1961); Shelly & Bassin, Daytop
Lodge: Halfway House for Drug Addicts, Fed. Prob. Dec. 1964, pp. 46-57.
72 Such contact would seem essential in a case like Driver's, where it was discovered
that he had no home or family. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and
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broader and more ambitious approach would be for a state to enact
a statute which, although providing for civil commitment, would
be applicable to all those who have been convicted of public drunk-
enness more than a fixed number of times regardless of whether or
not they could be technically classified as alcoholics. This approach
would offer preventive treatment to all who might possibly become
alcoholics and would be similar in purpose and effect to the scheme
used in rehabilitating juvenile delinquents. 73 Such a method would
appear to be a more rational means of eventually eliminating the
problems posed by the Driver case.
The Driver case, if accorded wide judicial acceptance, will leave
the states with many difficult hurdles to be cleared in the future.
The states should not, however, allow the inevitable difficulties
which will be encountered in shifting the alcoholic from jail to
hospital to deter them from rendering to history the criminal treat-
ment of alcoholics. The Driver case, while admittedly narrowing
state power to define crime, once again serves as a reminder that the
eighth amendment is not "static" but "must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society." 74
Washington Area Council on Alcoholism as Amid Curiae, p. 20. See also PITTMAN &
GORDON, op. cit. supra note 36, at 143. The observation of another authority is found
in JELLINEK, ALCOHOL ADDICTION AND CHRONIC ALCOHOLISM 70 (1942): "Graf has
pointed out that too little attention has been given to bringing the patient back into
the community. This must be regarded as a definite phase of the treatment and con-
tact with the patient in this phase should be maintained for considerable time."
"'See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-37 (1964); note 65 supra.
7
' Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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